Elegant Reasonism Supervenience

Philosophically, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible. Elegant Reasonism mode shifts supervenience traditional discussions of this philosophical field of study into full alignment with the unified Universe. In one sense Elegant Reasonism throws a monkey wrench into the middle of traditional discussions exactly because such formulations make the predicate assumption that they are working directly with reality rather than a simple human perception of reality (e.g. essentially they are committing Langer Epistemology Errors). If the predicate EIM establishing the parameters of A and B below do not close to unification then the entire discussion must be set aside as a logical problem to be mode shifted. The assumption being made above is that the human being is physically capable of perceiving and discerning 100% of the detail sets associated with the domain of discourse under investigation and that assumption is patently false. The Elegant Reasonism framework presents the necessary structure to bring the supervenience discussion and philosophy into full congruence with the unified Universe. Centrally at issue is that EIMs fully establish fundamental interpretive context. When that context is in flux EIM to EIM we must then follow the Elegant Reasonism Generalized Process Flow and the Decision Checkpoint Flowchart to fully enable mode shifting in order to gain full compliance relative to and respective of the unified Universe. Supervenience, as a philosophy, demands manifestation by the unified Universe and not some confused subset.


In the contemporary literature, there are two primary (and non-equivalent) formulations of supervenience (for both definitions let A and B be sets of properties).

(1) A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if all things that are B-indiscernible are A-indiscernible. Formally:


  • ∀ x ∀ y ( ∀ X ∈ B ( X x ↔ X y ) → ∀ Y ∈ A ( Y x ↔ Y y ) ) {\displaystyle \forall x\forall y(\forall X_{\in B}(Xx\leftrightarrow Xy)\rightarrow \forall Y_{\in A}(Yx\leftrightarrow Yy))}

(2) A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if anything that has an A-property has some B-property such that anything that has that B-property also has that A-property. Formally:

  • ∀ x ∀ X ∈ A ( X x → ∃ Y ∈ B ( Y x ∧ ∀ y ( Y y → X y ) ) ) {\displaystyle \forall x\forall X_{\in A}(Xx\rightarrow \exists Y_{\in B}(Yx\land \forall y(Yy\rightarrow Xy)))}

For example, if one lets A be a set of mental properties, lets B be a set of physical properties, and chooses a domain of discourse consisting of persons, then (1) says that any two persons who are physically indiscernible are mentally indiscernible, and (2) says that any person who has a mental property has some physical property such that any person with that physical property has that mental property.

Some points of clarification: first, the definitions above involve quantification over properties and hence higher-order logic. Second, in (1), expressions of the form ( ∀ X ( X x ↔ X y ) ) {\displaystyle (\forall X(Xx\leftrightarrow Xy))} capture the concept of sharing all properties, or being indiscernible with respect to a set of properties. Thus, (1) can be understood more intuitively as the claim that all objects that are indiscernible with respect to a base set of properties are indiscernible with respect to a supervenient set of properties, or, as it is also sometimes said, that B-twins are A-twins. Finally, supervenience claims typically involve some modal force, however, the way that modal force is specified depends on which more specific variety of supervenience one decides upon (see below).

(1) and (2) are sometimes called "schemata" because they do not correspond to actual supervenience relations until the sets of properties A and B, the domain of entities to which those properties apply, and a modal force have been specified. For modal forms of supervenience, the modal strength of the relation is usually taken to be a parameter (that is, the possible worlds appealed to may be physically possible, logically possible, etc.). Also, note that in the early literature properties were not always central, and there remain some who prefer to frame the relation in terms of predicates, facts, or entities instead, for example.


NOTE: This page is under heavy development and constitutes a placeholder page that will extend and elaborate as time permits on this topic. Our intention is to formalize Elegant Reasonism Supervenience.



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